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Space Shuttle Columbia Aging Wiring Failure Analysis 
Steven I McDanels National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), Kennedy Space Center, 
Florida, USA 
ABSTRACT 
A Space Shuttle Columbia main engine controller 14 AWG wire short circuited during the launch of 
STS-93. Post-flight examination divulged that the wire had electrically arced against the head of a 
nearby bolt. More extensive inspection revealed additional damage to the subject wire, and to other 
wires as well from the mid-body of Columbia. The shorted wire was to have been constructed from 
nickel-plated copper conductors surrounded by the polyimide insulation Kapton®, topcoated with an 
aromatic polyimide resin. The wires were analyzed via scanning electron microscope (SEM), energy 
dispersive X-Ray spectroscopy (EDX), and electron spectroscopy for chemical analysis (ESCA); 
differential scanning calorimetry (DSC) and thermal gravimetric analysis (TGA) were performed on the 
polyimide. Exemplar testing under laboratory conditions was performed to replicate the mechanical 
damage characteristics evident on the failed wires. The exemplar testing included a step test, where, as 
the name implies, a person stepped on a simulated wire bundle that rested upon a bolt head. Likewise, 
a shear test that forced a bolt head and a torque tip against a wire was performed to attempt to damage 
the insulation and conductor. Additionally, a vibration test was performed to determine if a wire 
bundle would abrade when vibrated against the head of a bolt. Also, an abrasion test was undertaken to 
determine if the polyimide of the wire could be damaged by rubbing against convolex helical tubing. 
Finally, an impact test was performed to ascertain if the use of the tubing would protect the wire from 
the strike of a foreign object. 
KEYWORDS Failure analysis, wiring, damage, SEM, EDS, ESCA 
Approximately five seconds after the liftoff of the space shuttle Columbia on STS-93, a main engine 
controller wire short circuited, resulting in a potential single point failure for two main engine power 
controllers. Post-flight inspection of the Orbiter divulged arcing damage to a wire in a lower wire tray 
in the midbody port side of the Space Shuttle Columbia, Figure 1. 
Figure 1
Cargo Bay of OV-102.
The damaged wire was immediately adjacent to a charred bolt head. Similarly, an additional region of 
damage, in this case an area of exposed conductor, was observed on the same wire approximately 2 
inches away from the arced region. It was noted that another bolt head was adjacent to this damaged 
region as well. Each of the bolts corresponding to the regions of damaged wire had plastically 
deformed slots with exposed base metal where the bolt head slots had been deformed; the wiring 
opposite the damaged areas did not display any damage. The subject bolts and damaged wiring was 
harvested for failure analysis, Figure 2.
Figure 2 
Black arrow indicates arcing location, with the corresponding bolt immediately beneath it. White 
arrow indicates a second area of damage. 
The subject wiring was examined macroscopically. Regions of mechanical damage were observed, with 
the damage mainly transverse and slightly off- centerline. A melted region was evident adjacent to the 
mechanically-damaged area. Deposits of dark, charred material were noted. Similarly, the topcoat of the 
wiring on each side of the arced region were also deformed, Figure 3. 
Figure 3
Areas of mechanical damage are indicated by black arrows, shorted regions by white arrows. 
A charred area on the bolt head was observed, Figure 4, in the region which was located next to the 
charred region of the wire. Areas of raised, shiny base metal were present on the edges of the bolt head 
slots. No paint was evident on the raised areas.
Figure 4 
Deformed, charred bolt head. 
The second area of damage on the subject wire had its insulation pushed up in a transverse direction, 
Figure 5. The conductor in this area displayed mechanical gouging. 
Figure 5 
Second damaged area, with mechanical damage to the conductors denoted by the black arrow. 
Deformation was evident on the topcoat and conductors. 
Both damaged regions of wiring were examined with a scanning electron microscope (SEM) equipped 
with energy dispersive X-Ray spectroscopy (EDX). Electron spectroscopy for chemical analysis 
(ESCA) was also employed. The polyimide insulation was absent in the charred regions. The damaged 
insulation did not appear serrated; rather it appeared smooth and even. Three zones of distinctive 
topographical characteristics were observed: a melted region, a zone displaying microvoid coalescence 
(MVC), and a mechanically damaged area, Figure 6. 
Figure 6 
Micrograph of arced area. The melted region is between the "MELT" and "MVC" zones, with 
mechanical damage evident in the areas denoted "MECH." Magnification: 27X
A mixture of melting and mechanical damage was evident on the central region of the charred area, 
Figure 7. Directional gouges were observed in the areas of the conductor displaying mechanical 
damage, Figure 8. MVC, indicative of ductile overload, was evident in the final zone of the exposed 
area, Figure 9. The MYC correlates to an area where the wire melted and bonded to the bolt head, 
Figure 10. Charring and melting appeared to be restricted to the outermost strands of the wire. The 
inner strands appeared intact. The bolt head was examined via EDX and ESCA; copper and nickel 
were present. An oxide layer was detected via ESCA on the shorted wire. The oxide layer depth of the 
subject wire was contrasted to oxide layer depths of exemplars of newly nicked copper wire and 
specimens nicked two years previously; the oxide layer depth of the subject wire was significantly 
deeper than the oxide layer depths of the exemplars. 
.
. 
...	 -S 
-.	
-S.	 -... -	 -.-	 - 
-	
-. 
- 
S	
. 	 -	 I	 :. 
Figure 7

Micrograph of the transition from heat to mechanical damage. Magnification: 370X 
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Figure 8
Micrograph of mechanically damaged region of the conductors. Magnification: 90X 
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Figure 9

Micrograph displaying MVC. Magnification: 1 ,500X
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Figure 10

Micrograph of melted metal on the bolt head. Magnification: 1 6X 
Mechanical damage was observed via SEM on the second damaged portion observed aft of the charred 
area. Gouging, predominantly transverse to the length of the wire, Figure 11, was evident. Additional 
ESCA evaluation indicated that the oxide layer on this portion was also thicker than the laboratory-
induced exemplars. 
Various additional analyses, including infrared (IR), thermal gravimetric analysis (TGA), and 
differential scanning calorimetry (DSC) of new polyimide insulation, as well as the subject wire's 
insulation, was performed; no significant differences were observed. 
Laboratory-controlled mechanical testing was performed in an attempt to replicate the features and 
characteristics observed on the failed conductors and insulators. Vibrational testing was performed to 
simulate the service environment encountered by similar wiring in the Orbiter's mid body. No damage 
was produced via vibration until an additional load of 2100 grams was added to the test wire bundle, 
which forced the bundle against a bolt head. Although this is not actually encountered during service, it 
proved necessary in generating vibrationally-induced damage. 
Figure 11
Vibration test specimen. 
Shear testing did not damage the test bundles. Only the addition of 42 pounds of force caused any 
damage to the bundle, Figure 12.
____ - 
Figure 12
42 pound shear test specimen.
Step testing was performed. Increasing levels of effort and force were utilized, but did not damage the 
conductor, Figure 13.
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Macrographs of step test specimens, with increasing force. 
SEM examination of the step test specimens showed only topcoat/insulator damage. No conductor 
damage was observed. 
The drop test as well as the abrasion test, Figure 14, indicated that the convolex tubing experienced 
damage prior to any damage to the conductor.
Figure 14
Convolex tubing with associated test specimen.
The subject controller wire exhibited mechanical damage in several locations; the mechanical damage 
was likely extant prior to the arcing event. The mechanical damage tore the insulator and damaged the 
underlying conductor, eventually resulting in a short when the conductor contacted the adjacent bolt 
head. The bolt head's base metal, exposed as a result of plastic deformation likely induced during 
loosening, contacted the conductor while the wires were energized. The resultant absence of a 
protective coating predisposed system to a short. The presence of nickel and copper, verified via 
chemical analyses, in the melt zone on the iron-based bolt head, indicated that the conductor had fused 
with the bolt head. Eventually an applied mechanical force separated the conductor and wire, resulting 
in MVC on the fused zone. The uniformity of the MVC, with no evidence of a progressive, cyclic 
separation, tends to indicate that the separation was a single event. 
The shorted wire displayed damage in two locations; each location was above the head of an associated 
bolt. This signified that comparable occurrences likely damaged each area. The exemplar testing 
indicated that stepping on or vibration of the wire bundles likely would not induce the observed 
damage. After consulting with persormel working in the midbody of the Orbiter, it appeared probable 
that there were two likely scenarios for deformation of the bundles: either an impact, such as by a work 
platform, pliers, or torque tip; or an object being dropped onto or placed upon a bundle, thereby 
damaging the wires by forcing them against the heads of adjacent bolts. 
The oxide layers on both damaged areas of the subject conductor were significantly deeper than those 
layers of the exemplars, indicating that the mechanical damage of the shorted wire predated the short. 
Based upon the exemplar evidence, and additional ESCA testing, the age of the oxide layer on the 
failed wire was estimated to be between five and ten years old. 
Based upon the results of the failure analysis, recommendations were issued to ensure that bolts would 
be examined to verify that no raised or bare areas of metal were present on the heads of similar bolts. 
Any bolt with raised or exposed metal was to be smoothed andlor repainted as necessary. Likewise, an 
intensive inspection of wiring from each Orbiter in the fleet was undertaken to mitigate the likelihood 
of additional wiring failures. During the inspection, any wires found to be damaged or bolts discovered 
to be deformed or with bare metal present were replaced. Likewise, installation of convoluted tubing to 
protect the wire bundles was performed at this point. 
The combination of inspectiOn, replacement, and protective sheathing have all helped to successfully 
preclude any such similar failure to date. 
This document was prepared under the sponsorship of the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration. Neither the United States Government nor any person acting on behalf of the United 
States Government assumes any liability resulting from the use of the information contained in this 
document, or warrants that such use will be free from privately owned rights. 
The author would like to gratefully acknowledge the help and talents of: Peter Marciniak; Virginia 
Cummings; Dr. Richard Rapson; Patrick Faughrian; Stan Young; Dennis Peterson; John Eggers; Kirk 
Scammon
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